The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others' social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner's dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the "always defect" strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust.
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behavioral economics | cognitive neuroscience | corruption | cooperation | self-deception I ndividuals often deviate from the behavior that maximizes their material reward (1, 2) . For example, in the ultimatum game, people prefer to reject profitable offers that they consider unfair (3) . This behavior, and other phenomena such as fairness or cooperation (2, 4) , can be accounted for within a rational model that includes broader objectives or "social preferences" (altruism, fairness concerns, etc.) as part of the function which agents seek to optimize.
Naturally, agents seek to reduce the problems that arise when material rewards collide with social preferences. For example, believing that others are altruistic may make it more difficult for an agent to act selfishly which, in turn, may reduce its monetary payoff. A way of solving this tension is to develop a self-serving bias: that is, to believe that others are not altruistic to "justify" a selfish act. Cognitive dissonance theory (5, 6) aims to explain the emergence of belief with self-serving biases. The idea is that dissonance (contradiction) between cognitions is psychologically uncomfortable, and so it triggers mechanisms of dissonance reduction-and one way of doing so is by altering beliefs (7, 8) .
Self-deception mechanisms have been broadly studied in economics (2, 9) . Recently, using an experimental design called "The Corruption Game," we demonstrated two of these principles (10):
Principle 1 (P1) Selfish action alters beliefs about others' socialpreferences. P2 Ambiguity regarding others' social preferences increases the likelihood of acting selfishly.
We use the term Projection to refer to P1, which is a trait that describes how people blame others for their actions. The notion of Projection by which our actions affect how we think of others (11, 12) is at the same time intuitive and paradoxical. From a rational perspective, beliefs about others should be based on what they have done, not on what we have done to them. However, it has been observed that subjects in economic games not only take into account the previous actions of other players, but also their past actions (13, 14) . Additionally, people's beliefs also depend on their own previous actions (10) .
Here, we use the colloquial term Paranoia to refer to P2 (the idea that if there is ambiguity about how another person may act, an agent will sample the distribution biased for the worse outcomes). Closely related to P2 is the mechanism of "categorization" and "malleability" (15) . For example, stealing a pen is more malleable than stealing the money needed to buy the pen. Similarly, the distribution of beliefs on the moral judgment of the malleable case (stealing the pen) is ambiguous, and hence people may use this ambiguity in their favor to act more selfishly.
The aim of this work is twofold: first, to provide a mathematical description of these self-deception mechanisms (Paranoia and Projection); and second, based on this mathematical description, to investigate the impact that they may have on the evolution of trust among the agents of a society.
The Model
We study a set of 10 5 interacting agents that play a modified Prisoner's Dilemma (SI Appendix, section 1.1) game against each other in a static random network. The main difference from other similar approaches investigating networks and evolution of Significance "He who wants to kill his dog accuses it of having rabies," the French proverb says. The fact that we alter our beliefs about others to act selfishly and, at the same time, keep a positive self-view has been widely studied by behavioral sciences. Here, we propose a mathematical description of two of these mechanisms of altering beliefs and study a simulation of a society of agents provided with these biases. We find that there are sets of parameters that make societies propagate defection actions and others that protect them from spreading malicious behavior. cooperation (or corruption or reputation) (16) (17) (18) (19) is that here, we used a Bayesian updating rule and inference process (similar to ref. 20) . This rule was necessary to generate a mathematical model of cognitive biases Paranoia and Projection and study their impact on the propagation of strategies.
For clarity, we divide the strategy of the agents into three stages ( Fig. 1) : observation, inference, and decision. Observation is the process of accumulation of information about other agent's actions. The inference process uses observed information and combines it with priors to generate-using a Bayesian model-a belief about other agents' behavior. This stage is modeled as a beta-binomial process (SI Appendix, section 1.3). The output of the inference process is the expected reward for each possible action. Finally, in the decision stage, the agent chooses the option that maximizes her expected reward.
Under these settings, the agents in the network will end up defecting or cooperating with each other depending on the initial conditions. Our primary goal is to investigate how incorporating the cognitive biases described in the introduction (Paranoia and Projection) affect the evolution of cooperation or defection in the network. In the next subsection, we explain how these cognitive biases can be incorporated into a Bayesian inference process.
The essential step in the inferential process in our model is the estimation of an agent's probability of defection, θ, in a given interaction-or equivalently, the probability of cooperation pc = 1 − θ. If the estimation of θ is small enough, the agent will trust the other player and will cooperate; if not, the agent will choose to defect. An agent estimates θ based on her previous observations of the other agent.
In the beta-binomial model, the Beta distribution (SI Appendix, section 1.2) is used to describe the prior belief distribution of this variable. Agents use the mean value of their belief as an estimation of this parameter: 
where a and b are, respectively, the numbers of observed defections and cooperations. As a increases, respect to b,θ approaches 1, indicating that the agent believes that the other agent is likely to choose to defect. In this model, each agent has a specific belief distribution for each other agent she interacts with.
Paranoia and Projection have a different effect on the inference process. Broadly, Projection changes the beta distribution (as if own actions were fragments of observed actions), and Paranoia results in sampling unevenly (focusing on the worse outcomes) of the beta distribution.
Projection is a trait that describes how people blame others for their actions. Although an ideal observer constructs this distribution only from priors and observations, to model this characteristic, each time an agent defects, she modifies her beta distribution of beliefs. With Projection the actions of the agent impact on the resulting Beta distribution, which she then uses to estimate the probability of defection or cooperation.
Specifically, this is done by changing, whenever the agent defects, the a parameter (which measures the number of observed defections) of the Beta distribution. How much a is changed each time the agent defects is scaled by the parameter Projection in such a way that if Projection = 1 defecting on another agent has the same impact on the Beta distribution than if the other agent defects. If Projection = 0.1, 10 defections of an agent would have the same effect on its estimated Beta distribution than a defection by the other player, and so on. This same mechanism could be used when the agent cooperates-namely, when an agent cooperates, it changes its belief about others to think that it is more likely that others cooperate too. In this case, the value of Projection determines the variation on the b parameter of the Beta distribution after a cooperation.
We explore two different variations of the Projection bias. First, when the Projection affects only the a parameter if the agent defects. We call this asymmetric Projection. Second, when the Projection affects both, the a and the b, parameters after the agent defects or cooperates, correspondingly. We call this the symmetric Projection.
In both cases, the Projection bias changes the Beta parameters that describe the belief about all other agents, not only the one involved in the specific interaction. For example, if agent A defects in a given interaction with B, due to the effect of Projection, A will believe that B is more likely to defect. Similarly, A will believe that all other agents are more likely to defect. His own defection has changed his beliefs regarding how all of the other agents he will interact with will behave.
It is important to highlight that, even though this bias yields a wrong value forθ, that does not imply that this kind of computation is not optimal. In fact, in models where fairness and others' social preferences are incorporated into a more general utility function, beliefs and action correlate in the same way as in our model (10) . That is, the selfish acts are associated with the belief that others are selfish too. The main difference with our model is that, as has been shown experimentally, there is not only correlation but causation. Surprisingly, this causation is in both ways: Belief alters actions, and actions alter belief. Our model explicitly describes this two-way causation using a Bayesian estimation (from beliefs to actions) and by the Projection bias (from action to beliefs).
In ref. 10 , we showed that the effect of a defecting action produces an average variation of 0.2 in the belief. From this, we can have an estimate of the experimental value of Projection of 0.54 (see SI Appendix, section 1.4 for details). This result serves as an order of magnitude of realistic values of Projection when we inquire about the impact of this parameter on the propagation of cooperation and defection.
The other bias that we explore, Paranoia , acts on howθ is estimated from a distribution. If Paranoia = 0, the estimation of θ is the mean value of the variable, as it would be in an optimal inference process. When Paranoia assumes a nonzero value (here, we only investigate positive values), the estimation is given by this implicit equation.
This equation means that the agent shifts its estimate fromθ toθ m . The value of Paranoia measures the total area under the probability distribution between the optimal and biased estimatesθ andθ m . This equation also implies that the impact of Paranoia on the estimation ofθ m depends on the shape of the probability distribution. If there is substantial evidence of something, that will be reflected in a narrow and peaked distribution shape, and the effect of Paranoia onθ m will be weak. Instead, if the distribution is wide, meaning that there is insufficient evidence, this same amount of probability will cause a higher distortion in the estimated belief. This mechanism, then, reproduces the empirical fact that higher ambiguity increases the likelihood of being selfish (P2). Note also that Paranoia is measured in units of the probability distribution (and hence has one as absolute maximum).
This bias is closely related to the models of reciprocal altruism (10, 21) where belief may be altered too. In these models, changing the belief has a cost that increases as the difference between the unbiased and the biased belief increases. The Paranoia bias could be thought of as step function where there is no cost in changing a belief up to some point where the cost, suddenly, approaches infinity. The explicit description of the belief as the mean of a distribution allows us to model P2.
Results
We study how the network evolves when it is contaminated with a fraction of agents with the strategy ALLD (always defect). These agents do not learn or change their behavior in any way; they stubbornly defect independently of the history of actions.
All simulations begin with a network in which agents trust each other. That is, they believe that the expected reward of cooperating is higher than the expected reward for defecting (Fig. 5) . Then, we replace a fraction of the regular agents of the network by ALLD agents. These replacements are distributed at random in the sites of the network. Specifically, the question we ask here is how the network parameters convey more resistance or vulnerability to this "infection" process. To do so, we let the network evolve under the influence of ALLD agents and study whether the defection policy extends over the network.
Cascades. First, we study how the system evolves when one ALLD agent is introduced in the network. Under this condition, we measure the fraction of agents that are defecting to each other, which is called the active fraction, Sa . Fig. 2 shows how the Sa changes as Projection changes when we use the asymmetric version of the bias. There is a transition in the value Projection = 1.5 (dashed line in Fig. 2) . At this point, one ALLD agent is capable of changing the behavior of a finite fraction of all the other agents that start cooperating and end up defecting with each other. Or, in cascades jargon, it produces a "global cascade" of defection. If the symmetric version of the bias is used, the value of Projection changes the vul- nerability of the agents only if the value of the Paranoia is greater than zero. Then, a similar behavior is observed (SI Appendix, section 1.7).
In the case of the asymmetric bias, this value, Projection = 1.5, can be derived analytically following the method of Watts (22) , and the result is in agreement with the numerical simulation (SI Appendix, section 1.6).
Percolation and Phase Transitions. Now, we generalize this analysis to a broader situation, where not only one agent, but a fraction, f, of ALLD agents are present in the network. We examine the robustness of the system by analyzing its evolution as two parameters are changed: the fraction, f , and the value of the Projection parameter. We calculate the robustness of the network measuring Sa . Here, because there is more than one ALLD, we also incorporate a more refined measure of phase transition referred to as the size of the giant active component, Sgc. Sgc measures the size of the largest cluster of agents that are defecting to each other. If there is only one agent, Sa and Sgc are equivalent. Fig 3 shows Sgc in the (Projection, f ) map for the asymmetric version of the bias. It can be seen that the value of Sgc increases as the value of f or Projection increases. To better understand the transitions in this map, Fig. 4 shows the Sgc as a function of f for three values of Projection for the asymmetric bias.
When Projection = 0, the ALLD agents do not change the behavior of the regular agents of the network toward other agents. Then, the change in Sgc is due only to the fact that more ALLD agents are defecting in the network. Marked with an arrow in Fig. 4 , for this case, a continuous transition can be seen at f = fc1. If f < fc1, the value of Sgc is zero and if f > fc1 the value of Sgc take positive values. In this situation, the process can be mapped into a standard percolation (SI Appendix, section 1.8). The analytical result yields the value fc1 = 0.05, which is in agreement with the numerical simulations, as can be seen in Fig. 4 .
If the value of Projection is greater than zero, the actions of the ALLD agents change the belief of the regular agents in the network. In Fig. 4 , it can be seen that when Projection increases, the value of Sgc increases and the value of the critical point fc1 moves toward zero.
Interestingly, if the value of Projection ≥ 0.8, another kind of transition appears in the system. This second transition at f = fc2 is not continuous.
If the symmetric version of the Projection bias is used, the results remain equivalent only if the Paranoia bias is set to a value higher than 0 (SI Appendix, section 1.7). Next, we study more generally for all models, how Projection and Paranoia can interact to affect the robustness of the network. Projection and Paranoia Interaction. The Paranoia bias not only affects the dynamics, but the initial condition of the network as well. An agent may believe that others are likely to defect because her internal distribution (based only on the observation of the actions of other agents) has shifted toward defection or because her Paranoia bias parameter is greater than zero and her estimationθ m is higher than what the evidence shows her. Our analytic approach is to investigate the dynamics of a set of networks in which Paranoia and the mean of the Beta are covaried, maintaining the same initialθ m , and, hence, we combine priors and Paranoia parameters in such a way that they yield the same value ofθ m , as shown in Fig. 5 . In this way, we can be sure that any difference observed among the simulations is due to a change in the dynamics of the system and not to a change in the initial estimationθ m . Since the parameters of the Beta distribution are integers, this approach imposes a constraint on the values that the Paranoia bias can take to keep the initial estimationθ m unchanged. That is why we investigate only four values of Paranoia and not a more fine-grained set of values as we do with the Projection bias and the fraction of ALLD agents. But, we also explore the results using different initial values ofθ m and different values of agents' memory in SI Appendix, sections 1.9 and 1.10.
The four values of Paranoia depicted in Fig. 5 in combination with four values of Projection yield a matrix of 16 sets of parameters. As depicted in Fig. 6A , for the symmetric version of the Projection bias, the evolution of all networks could be grouped into three classes. For some parameters, marked in blue in Fig.  6B , the networks were highly cooperative, showing a smooth progression of Sa as a function of f . Interestingly, this is not the case for Sgc, which shows a sharp, but continuous, transition at f = fc1, as can be seen in Fig. 6C . This is evidence of a hidden phase transition, which is not visible in the overall activation, Sa . A second class, colored green in Fig. 6 , revealed a discontinuous transition in both, Sa and Sgc. For f < fc2, the network remains mostly cooperative and transitions abruptly to defection for f > fc2. For other parameters, instead, the network ends in a high defection state. Introducing a single ALLD agent is enough to shift the network toward total defection (red regions in Fig. 6A ). We refer to these three classes as (i) high cooperation, (ii) bistable, and (iii) high defection, respectively. These classes are also present when the initial value ofθ m is below the threshold cooperation (SI Appendix, section 1.9), and then these results are robust and do not depend on this specific initial value. As in the previous simulations, a similar map with the same type of states and transitions is found if we use the symmetric version of the Projection bias (SI Appendix, section 1.7).
A specific analysis of which priors yield to different regimes of stability (Fig. 6A, first row) indicates that when the Projection parameter is set to 0, regardless of the value of paranoia, the networks belong to the high-cooperation class. This means that the society is robust under the inception of a fraction of ALLD agents. For moderate values of Projection (0.25) which are lower than the estimated experimentally from ref. 10 , the network is in high cooperation for low values of Paranoia and shifts to bistability for values of Paranoia of 0.36. For this level of Projection, even for maximum values of Paranoia (this is very close to the strict maximum since greater values of Paranoia are incompatible with a network that begins in full cooperation), the network never is in the high-defection class. For higher values of Projection (0.75), which are slightly above experimental estimates, the network displays the three different behaviors, depending on the value of Paranoia. If it is zero, then the network is in high cooperation, and, as the value of Paranoia increases, the network behaves as a bistable system and, finally, is in a high defection state.
Discussion
By using a Bayesian updating rule in an agent-based simulation, we were able to model how two specific cognitive biases, Projection and Paranoia, impact the decision-making process. Then, we use this to inquire how these parameters affect the propagation of defection started by a set of ALLD agents.
Our first result is that if only one ALLD agent is introduced in the network, there is a threshold in the value of Projection up to which the agents keep cooperating with each other. If the value of Projection is higher than the threshold, then a positive fraction of the agents start to defect. In the case of the asymmetric version of the Projection bias, the threshold could be deduced analytically and coincides with the value found in our simulations.
Then, we find two kinds of transitions when a fraction of ALLD agents is introduced. If the value of Projection is low enough, there is only one transition at fc1 where the size of the giant component of defecting agents goes from being zero to being greater than zero, a continuous transition. If the value of Projection is >0.8, we find another transition at fc2, where the fraction of agents that are defecting to each other jumps in a noncontinuous manner. These two types of transitions resemble the transitions present in the bootstrap percolation process (23) . Even though there are differences between the two processes, the appearance of the same two kinds of transitions suggests that there is a connection between them. These same kinds of transitions have been observed in the spread of extreme opinions (24) . In ref. 24, Ramos et al. used a k-core model to explain their results which are closely related to bootstrap percolation (23) .
Additionally, we study how the effect of Paranoia and Projection interact in the spreading of the defections produced by fraction ALLD agents. The main result is that, if the Projection bias is set to zero, the Paranoia bias does not make the network m . The blue vertical line shows the limit above which the agent believes that the maximum reward is achieved by defecting and below which the agent believes that the maximum reward is obtained by cooperating. Ifθ m is higher than this value, then the agent decides to defect; if, on the contrary,θ m lays to the left of the blue vertical line the agent chooses to cooperate. Under these four conditions, the agents, initially, cooperate with each other. PDF, probability density function. less robust to the infection of ALLD agents. Only if it is combined with the Projection bias does it weaken the network.
A distinguishing characteristic of our model is that it is built upon a network, and the agents can choose a different action for different contacts. In their seminal work, Nowak and May (25) use a regular lattice where each agent plays only one action in each step against their contacts. This model is suitable to study the evolution of cooperation, but we believe that, to investigate cooperation at a cultural level, we have to add the possibility of acting differently with different contacts. We used a static random network, but this is just another parameter of the model that can be modified. For example, a network whose degree distribution follows a power law, or a small-world network, could be used (26, 27) . It is also possible to add dynamics to the network, allowing the interaction to change iteration after iteration. Additionally, the ALLD agents could be placed, not randomly, but rather in high-centrality nodes or in given k-shell within the network. This variation could be used to investigate the effect that highly connected people's behavior might have on the rest of the community.
The long-term motivation for this study is to understand why different societies may converge to different policies of cooperation and defection. One particular case which we are interested in, and which was the motivation for the work on the corruption game (10), was how this might impact in different degrees of corruption. Recently, Gächter and Schulz (28) using an anonymous die-rolling experiment (29) showed that there is a correlation between individual traits and global corruption. The corruption game (10) was measured in the United States and Argentina, where there are very different indices of corruption and results were not very different. This suggests that Projection is not the most likely psychological bias to account for. This is consistent with our findings that a wide range of behaviors is only observed for experimentally observed values of Projection. Within this range, variability in Paranoia may explain bifurcations between societies that (with similar initial states) converge to defection or cooperation, or similarly in our interest to a high or low level of corruption. Another source of variability could be the effective impact of the ALLD agents in a society. Some governments have more efficient institutions which control the acts of the ALLD agents more effectively. Small changes in this control could lead to a different effective fraction of ALLD agents which, in a society that is in a bistable state, will lead to convergence to cooperation or defection.
Our work builds on, and links, two different fields of behavioral sciences. On the one hand, a tradition that has studied agents with simple, yet effective, strategies, and which of these strategies prevails in different contexts. Under this approach, using unbiased agents, the appearance and prevalence of corruption have been investigated (17, 18, 20) . The conundrum of the emergence of cooperation has been addressed under this framework, too (30, 31) . On the other hand, our work builds on a Bayesian approach to decision making that has sought to inquire how priors and evidence are used to generate beliefs and guide actions (32, 33) . This work can be seen as a mixture of these two traditions, where we can then ask how low-level psychological constructs which affect the inferential process (micro) have an impact on the large-scale organization of societies (macro). To build this bridge between these traditions, we use network theory, and the process that emerged under this framework was very similar to an already-known network process: bootstrap percolation. We did not impose this process, but it was the result of the cognitive model of the agents. Under this framework, we find that small variations on cognitive biases could have a significant impact on the average behavior of all of society. According to our model, society-level phenomena, including the broken window theory (34) of corruption among countries, is the consequence of cognitive dissonance reduction mechanisms such as Projection and Paranoia.
